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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
T H E L M A B. W A S E S C H A ,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
T E R R A , INC., and
L A M A R S. W A S E S C H A ,
Defendants and Appellant, \ Case No.
13668
T E R R A , INC., a Utah corporation,
Cross-Claimant and Appellant,
vs.
L A M A R S. W A S E S C H A ,
Cross-Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE
This is an action for rescission of a loan transaction,
cancellation of a real estate mortgage, and recovery of
amounts paid in excess of the loan principal. Defendant
Terra, Inc., counterclaimed and cross-claimed for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, and defendant La1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mar S. Wasescha counterclaimed against Terra, Inc.,
for set off of excess interest and for general relief.
The trial court rescinded the loan transaction and
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
Terra, Inc., for $2,882.73, attorney's fees, and costs. It
dismissed the counterclaims and cross-claim.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
There are omissions and inaccuracies in Appellant's
Statement which necessitate a more complete statement.
Defendant Terra, Inc., is a Utah corporation organized in 1964, at which time it had a small loan license
(R. 149). Commencing as of September 2, 1969, it was
authorized and empowered to make supervised loans
(R. 33). The company is examined annually by the
U.C.C.C. administrator (R. 193). As of June 30, 1971,
Terra, Inc., had 11 outstanding loans, totaling in excess
of $28,000.00 (Ex. 14). The corporation's president and
owner of approximately 90 percent of its stock is Alan
D. Frandsen, an attorney at law (R. 149, 161), and the
corporation conducts its business in Mr. Frandsen's law
office (R. 159).
The plaintiff, Thelma B. Wasescha, and defendant
LaMar S. Wasescha are husband and wife. They were
2
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married on September 16, 1970, and within a week or
two after the wedding Mr. Wasescha commenced putting pressure on Mrs. Wasescha to assist him in obtaining a loan from Terra, Inc. H e asked her to mortgage
her home, then in joint ownership with her former husband, but she refused (R. 164). The pressure continued,
and on October 8, 1970, Mr. and Mrs. Wasescha went
to the office of Terra, Inc., to take out the loan (R.
165). There is some dispute in the testimony as to just
what happened after that. Mrs. Wasescha testified that
she would not sign the papers until the part containing
a mortgage on her home was crossed out. She says that
it was crossed out and that she subsequently signed (R.
165). The testimony is undisputed that she did not want
to give a mortgage. Mr. Wasescha so testified (R* 208,
209), as did Mary J o Smith, the secretary in the offices
of Terra, Inc. (R. 187), and Mr. Frandsen (R, 228).
There was testimony that things were confused at the
time of this meeting and that there was a shuffling of
papers back and forth. Apparently Mrs. Wasescha did
sign a mortgage, but with the understanding that the
real property had been deleted from it (R. 165). The
mortgage was not acknowledged before the notary public who signed it, but was presented to her by Mr.
Frandsen (R. 167, 171, 186).
At that time Terra, Inc., did not give to the Waseschas a statement disclosing the material terms of the
transaction, or a notice of right to rescind the agreement
as required for consumer loans under both state and federal statutes and regulations.
3
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It was Mrs. Wasescha's understanding at the time
of the transaction that the demand for a mortgage on
her home had been abandoned and that the note would
be secured by Mr. Wasescha's interest in an employee's
stock purchase plan (R. 166). The note (Ex. 1) is consistent with this understanding, the only reference to
security being the final paragraph:
The undersigned LaMar S. Wasescha has
pledged all of the shares he presently holds in
TransAmerican Employee Lot Purchase Plan,
approximately 173 shares with an approximate
value of $2,500.00, said shares are held in trust
and can be secured by the undersigned by terminating his employment or voluntarily requesting a termination of the plan.
The real property mortgage was recorded by Terra, Inc., on August 13, 1971 (Ex. 2).
The note provided that interest would be paid
monthly for the first six months and that thereafter payments would be made on principal and interest, the entire balance to be paid within 42 months. It did not specify how much principal was to be paid monthly.
I n the beginning the interest was not paid as required. Between April 26, 1971, and August 26, 1971,
five $100.00 payments were made by Mr. Wasescha
(Ex. 4, It. 214). Commencing in January, 1972, Mrs.
Wasescha began making payments of interest and principal and continued to make them on a regular basis. On
June 15, 1973, this action was commenced by Mrs. Wasescha against her husband (from whom she was then

4
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separated) and Terra, Inc., in the belief that they were
both responsible to her (R. 174). Before the action was
commenced she had reduced the indebtedness from
$5,496.44 to $4,552.13 (Ex. 5). She continued to make
payments throughout the pendency of the action.
Despite the fact that Mrs. Wasescha's payments
were being accepted on a regular basis (Ex. 5), and
that there had been no declaration of default, Terra,
Inc., filed a counterclaim and cross-claim for foreclosure
of the mortgage (R. 120). Mrs. Wasescha continued to
make payments on the mortgage indebtedness and
Terra, Inc., continued to accept them. As of December
31, 1973, the indebtedness, according to the records of
Terra, Inc., had been reduced to $3,995.32.
Prior to January 10, 1973, the Waseschas learned
that Mr. Wasescha was to be transferred by his employer to the State of Washington, and it became necessary to clear the title in order to sell her Salt Lake City
home (R. 171).
On January 2, 1974, Mrs. Wasescha's counsel telephoned Mr. Frandsen and asked him for the pay off
figure on the mortgage (R. 234). On the same day Mr.
Frandsen wrote a letter to counsel stating that the
amount due and owing on January 10, 1974, was
$4,015.22, together with court costs in the amount of
$17.60 and interest at $2.01 per day after January 10
(Ex.7).
On January 10, 1974, Mrs. Wasescha completed
the closing of the sale of her home and at that time paid

5
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to Terra, Inc., the full amount requested in Mr. Frandsen's letter, $4,032.73 (R. 158). The amounts paid on
the $5,000.00 note totaled $7,882.73 (R. 158, Ex. 4, 5).
Terra, Inc., released the mortgage and acknowledged
that the debt had been "fully paid, satisfied and discharged" (Ex. 6).
I t is undisputed that no disclosure statement or notice of right to rescind was given to Mr. or Mrs. Wasescha at or about the time the money was lent (October 8,1970) or at any time prior to June 30,1971. Mr.
Frandsen and his secretary testified that on or about
June 30, 1971, after an examination by the state and at
the direction of the administrator, disclosure statements
and notices of right to rescind were sent to all their borrowers (R. 153, 190, 193) but other evidence casts
doubt on the testimony. Both Mr. and Mrs. Wasescha
denied having received such documents; a copy of the
notice of right of rescission (Ex. 2) was not a duplicate
of the one said to have been sent, and had not been in
the file when Mary J o Smith's deposition was taken. I t
was prepared and filed in the month before the trial—
probably in February, 1974 (R. 198).
Although Mary J o Smith testified that the notices
were sent at the examiner's direction on June 30,1971, a
letter purportedly sent by Terra, Inc., to the Waseschas
on July 2,1971, stated that the bank examiner had been
in on July 1, and that he was concerned about the failure
to record the mortgage on the real property and the fact
that payments were not made as indicated. Nothing was
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said about enclosing the documents in question (Ex.
11).
The notice of right to rescission referred to the loan
transaction of October 8, 1970, and stated:
If you decide to cancel this transaction, you
may do so by notifying Terra, Inc., at 353 East
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by
mail or telegram sent not later than midnight of
October 11, 1970. (Emphasis added.)
The statement of transaction (Ex. 13) set out a
finance charge of $3,150.00, which was inaccurate in
light of the balloon payment provision of the note, and
stated that the loan was secured by a real estate mortgage. It contained no reference to the fact that the loan
was secured by Mr. Wasescha's stock.
Mrs. Wasescha testified that she had paid all of the
$3,350.00 shown in the payment book (Ex. 5), and that
the final $4,032.73 had been made from the proceeds of
the sale of her home (R. 201).
As pointed out in Appellant's Brief, a supplemental complaint and reply to counterclaim was filed by
Mrs. Wasescha on March 4,1974, approximately 9 days
prior to the date set for trial. Appellant failed to point
out that as of February 16, 1974, Terra, Inc., acknowledged service of the supplemental complaint (R. 54).
In a motion heard March 11, 1974, Terra, Inc., requested leave to raise the defense of accord and satisfaction based upon payment of the note and release of
the mortgage, which motion was denied.
7
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Trial commenced on March 13, 1974, and defendant LaMar Wasescha did not appear. No default having been requested or entered, the trial proceeded without his participation.
After hearing the evidence the court concluded
that a statement of transaction and a notification of
right of rescission as required by the Uniform Commercial Credit Code, the Federal Truth in Lending
Act, Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board, and
regulations of the U.C.C.C. Administrator had not been
given to the Waseschas. It concluded that the borrowers
had a right to rescind the transaction and that Mrs. Wasescha was entitled to recover all sums in excess of the
principal amount of the note, together with a $700.00
attorney's fee, and costs.

ARGUMENT
I
T H E M O T I O N O F A P P E L L A N T TO R A I S E
T H E D E F E N S E O F "ACCORD A N D SATISFACTION" WAS PROPERLY DENIED.
On March 6, 1974, Terra, Inc., filed a motion for
leave to file an amended complaint raising the defenses
of statute of limitations and accord and satisfaction, and
reasserting its right to recover attorney's fees (R. 44).
The motion was not supported by any affidavit, the proposed amended pleading was not attached ot the motion,
and the motion did not "state with particularity the
S
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grounds therefor" as required by the provisions of Rule
7(b) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court heard the arguments and statements of counsel, but no record of the hearing was included in the record on appeal.
Although the motion was denominated a motion to
amend, the accord and satisfaction or "compromise and
settlement" defense was based upon matters occurring
subsequent to the filing of the original answer, and
should properly be treated as a motion to file a supplemental pleading. Rule 15 (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, provides:
Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are
just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting fourth transactions or occurrences or
events which have happened since the date of the
pleading sought to be supplemented. * * *
W e do not contend that the motion was improper
because of what it was called, but to point out the rule,
as stated in 3 Moore's Federal Practice (2nd Edition)
Hl5.16[3]:
The decision to grant or deny leave to file a
supplemental pleading is one for the discretion
of the district court, and will not be disturbed on
appeal except for abuse of discretion.
There is nothing in the record to show that the
court abused its discretion by denying the motion. The
court did not set out the reasons for its ruling, but it
might have denied the motion for lack of timeliness; in-
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consistency with the reasserted claim for attorney's fees;
disruption of the trial schedule because of the possibility
that trial counsel would have to be a witness; lack of
contractual elements; the spurious nature of the mortgage foreclosure claim; or absence of authority under
78-51-32 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
I t is well settled that the decisions of the trial court
on motions and proceedings before it are presumably
valid.
In Palfreymen v. Bates and Rogers Const. Co.,
108 Utah 142, 158 P.2d 132 (1945), this court said:
There is a presumption that the judgment of
the trial court was correct, and every reasonable
intendment must be indulged in favor of it; the
burden of affirmatively showing error is on the
party complaining thereof [citations omitted].
Similarly, this court in Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah
2d 195, 468 P.2d 360 (1970) said:
Where the court has a statutory alternative
based on discretion, we take it that there is a presumption that the judge's conclusion is clothed
with propriety and bona fides, destroy able only
by clear evidence adduced by him who attacks it.
The record here discloses little or nothing indicating that such burden was met.
And in Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428,150 P.2d
100 (1944), the court said:
On appeal the appellant has the burden of
showing wherein the trial court erred. If the
record is not sufficient to determine a material

10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

question because of the fact that the appellant
has failed to bring enough of it before us, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of sustaining
the judgment.
See also Reid v. Anderson, 116 Utah 455, 211 P.2d
206, 1949; Burton v. Z.C.M.I., 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d
514 (1952); and Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275
P.2d 680 (1954).
The general rule is well stated in 5 C.J.S., Appeal
and Error, §15.41:
Generally, for the purpose of sustaining the
judgment being reviewed, the court will make
all reasonable presumptions with respect to
amended or supplemental pleadings, in favor of
the correctness of the trial court's action concerning the same; and presumptions which would
place the trial court in error ordinarily will not
be made.
Unless there is some contrary showing which
prevents the making of the particular presumption, all reasonable presumptions will be made in
support of the propriety of the trial court's action
in allowing or refusing an amendment or supplemental pleading * * *.
In order for the appellant to prevail with respect to
this matter, he must show both error and prejudice, that
is, that his substantial rights are affected and that there
is at least a fair likelihood that the result would have
been different. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237
P.2d 834 (1951), and Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
11
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Although accord and satisfaction was not allowed
to be pleaded, Terra, Inc., was permitted to put before
the trial court the evidence upon which it relied, on the
ground that it was material on the questions of waiver
and mootness.
The accord and satisfaction was apparently based
upon the payment of the mortgage by Mrs. Wasescha
when it became necessary for her to move to the State of
Washington. But the evidence would not support a
finding of accord and satisfaction or of compromise and
settlement. The only dealings were between Alan D.
Frandsen and Mrs. Wasescha's attorney. Mr. Frandsen's testimony is that Mrs. Wasescha's attorney called
him up and asked for a pay off and that Mr. Frandsen
told him that he would have his secretary compute it (R.
237). H e was asked about the amount owing on the note
(R. 238) and about attorney's fees but said he would
take the principal, interest and costs (R. 239). At that
time he knew the Waseschas were leaving the state and
had to have a payoff figure (R. 241). There is no testimony that anything was said about settlement of Mrs.
Wasescha's claim against Terra, Inc. There is no hint of
a compromise settlement in Mr. Frandsen's letters of
January 2 and January 7 (Ex. 7 and 8). In the letter of
January 2,1974, there is a simple statement that he had
computed the balance owing on the note and asked for
that plus his court costs, and that he would execute a release on payment of the sums mentioned. In his letter of
January 7, he restated the balance and said, " I will expect you to hold and not record the attached release
until I am paid in full."
12
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Supporting the view that the court could not have
found in favor of such a defense is the tenuous nature
of the counterclaim for foreclosure. The evidence is
clear that at the time of filing of the counterclaim there
had been no declaration of default and that payments
were made by Mrs. Wasescha on a regular basis both
before and after the institution of this proceeding.
Despite the introduction by Terra, Inc., of all the
evidence it had on the negotiations respecting payment
of the mortgage, the court found as a fact that in making
the mortgage payment Mrs. Wasescha did not intend
to and did not waive her rights to claim the recovery of
the finance charges as sought in the original complaint.
This is supported by the evidence. I t is common knowledge that one who must clear title to make a sale has no
choice but to pay the amount claimed by the mortgagee.
Payment into court would not clear the title and might
postpone indefinitely the sale of the property.
II

THE LOAN INVOLVED IN THIS CASE W A S
SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE FEDERAL TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
AND THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE.
Terra, Inc., takes the position that it was not obligated to give its borrowers disclosure statements or notifications of right to rescission because it was not regularly engaged in the business of making loans.
13
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Two statutes and a federal regulation are involved:
the Federal Truth in Lending Act, the Utah Uniform
Consumer Code, and Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board.
Although the state and federal stautes have similar
objectives, their coverage is defined in different terms.
The Truth in Lending Act applies to each consumer
credit transaction by a "creditor." "Credit" and "creditor" are defined in 15 U.S.C. §1602 as follows:
(e) The term "credit" means the right granted
by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of a
debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.
(f) The term "creditor" refers only to creditors who regularly extend, or arrange for the extension of, credit for which the payment of a finance charge is required, whether in connection
with loans, sales of property, or services, or
otherwise. The provisions of this sub-chapter
apply to any such creditor, irrespective of his or
its status as a natural person or any time of organization.
This definition is augmented by Regulation Z of
the Federal Reserve Board as follows:
"Creditor" means a person who in the
course of business regularly extends or
for the extension of consumer credit, or
extend or arrange for the extension
credit. (12 C.F.R., §226.2[m])

ordinary
arranges
offers to
of such

I n the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 70B-3-104
Utah Code Annotated 1953 a "consumer loan" is a loan
made by a person "regularly engaged in the business of
14
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making loans" with respect to described debtors and
debts. A "supervised loan" is one type of consumer loan.
70B-3-102 and 70B-3-501 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
The federal statute thus applies to those who regularly extend or offer to extend credit, while the Utah
statute applied to those who are regularly engaged "in
the business" of making specified types of loans. If a
person regularly extends credit, he is subject to the federal statute regardless of the business in which he is engaged. "Regularly" does not imply that the extension
of credit represents any particular percentage of a creditor's activity. The report of the Bankruptcy and Currency Committee of the House of Representatives, December 13, 1967, deals briefly with the provision in its
section by section summary of the Truth in Lending
Act. The report states:
Definition of "creditor"—covers only those
who regularly engage in credit transactions.
Thus a small retailer who extended credit and
charged for it in an isolated instance to accommodate a particular customer would not be covered.
(1968 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, Volume I I page 1980.) (Emphasis
added.)
W e have found no cases construing the Utah statute, but the Truth in Lending Act has been before the
courts on several occasions. A very recent case is Eby v.
Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9 Cir. 1974), brought
under the civil liability section of the Truth in Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. §1640. The realty company claimed it
15
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was not a "creditor" within the meaning of the statute.
The defendant's records showed that it was primarily a
real estate broker acting as an intermediary between
purchasers and sellers. During the 19 months preceding
the lawsuit, it had sold seven parcels of property for its
own account. In only three instances, (April and October, 1969, and August, 1970) was credit extended by
Reb Realty. But the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the debtor.
The Court of Appeals upheld the summary judgment, saying:
The issue is then presented whether, on the
facts of record, Reb Realty "regularly extended
credit" and was thus a creditor within the Act.
The question is one of first impression upon
which there is little guidance. The statutory definition only focuses inquiry on the word "regularly." The Federal Reserve Board's definition,
contained in its interpretive regulations on the
Act—Regulation Z—goes but a little further:
a creditor is one "who in the ordinary course
of business" regularly extends credit. 12 C.F.R.
§226.2 (m) (1973).
The legislative history, though sparse on this
point, is of some help. I n both the house and senate reports, the only commment relevant to the
definition of creditor indicates that the term is to
have a broad scope. "Thus a small retailer who
extended c r e d i t . . . in an isolated instance to accommodate a particular customer would not be
covered [by the Act]." H.R.Rep. No. 1040, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1968); S.Rep. No. 392, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1967). 1968 U.S. Code
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Cong. & Admin. News, p. 1962. Reading this
along with the definitions in the statute and Regulation Z, the intent seems to have been to except
from the Act only those lenders who extensions
of credit are an occasional, isolated, and incidental portion of their business.
Informal letters, issued by the staff of the
Federal Reserve Board, are a further indication
that the term "creditor" should be expansively
read. While these letters are hardly binding on a
court, they do represent an "experienceCd] and
informed judgment to which courts * * * may
properly resort for guidance." [citations omitted]
In one letter, for example, a home owner was advised that he would not be a creditor simply because he accepted a mortgage in the sale of his
own home. A letter from Milton W . Shober,
Ass't Director, Nov. 4, 1969, reported at 4
C.C.H. Consum. Credit Guide 1130,206. More
importantly, a 1970 staff letter opined that a corporation, distributing its stock on credit, would
be a creditor for purposes of disclosing the credit
terms of the sale. "CI]t appears to us that the restriction of the application of the Act to 'creditors' was included merely because of the unfairness of placing a burden on a private party to
make disclosures in connection with his casual
isolated sales." Letter from Milton W . Shobar,
Ass't Director, Feb. 19, 1970, reported at 4
C.C.H. Consum. Credit Guide 1130,313 (emphasis added by court).
The Truth in Lending Act is a remedial statute designed as much as possible to permit borrowers to make informed judgments about the
use of credit. To effectuate this congressional
purpose requires that the Act's terms be liberally
construed, [citations omitted] Here, realty sales
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were a significant aspect of appellant's business.
And in nearly half its sales, it extended credit to
its customers. They were credit transactions involving a large amount of money and not, after
all, like granting credit for a bag of groceries. In
view of this, we cannot say Reb Realty's extensions of credit were the type of isolated incidental transactions the definition of creditor was
meant to exempt.
The claim by Terra, Inc., that it does not come
within the statutes and regulation seems to be an afterthought, not having been raised in any pleading or in
the opening statement of counsel (R. 145-147).
The pleadings and evidence support findings that
Terra, Inc., regularly makes, and that it is regularly
engaged in "the business" of making, consumer loans.
The pleadings tacitly admit the applicability of the
statutes. In its answer, Terra, Inc., claimed that it had
complied with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Credit Code. In its supplemental counterclaim and
cross-complaint, Terra, Inc., avers that it has complied
with the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and that
it is "authorized and empowered to make supervised
loans in Salt Lake City, Utah, commencing as of September 2,1969" (R. 33, 34).
According to the testimony of the corporation's
president and principal shareholder, Alan D. Frandsen,
the firm was organized in 1964, and "at that time it was
a small loan—had a small loan license" (R. 149).
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From this evidence alone the court could find as a
fact that the company was regularly engaged in the
business of making consumer loans, absent some believable testimony to the contrary. Both Mr. Frandsen and
his secretary, Mary J o Smith, testified that Terra, Inc.,
made only two or three loans a year and that there were
only five loans outstanding, both at the time this loan
was made and at the time of the examination by the
State Department of Financial Institutions on June 30,
1971. But Exhibit 14 reveals that as of June 30, 1971,
Terra, Inc., had eleven outstanding loans in the total
amount of $28,480.77, and that in order for a supervised
lender's license to be retained it was mandatory that
Terra, Inc., comply with the Utah Uniform Consumer
Credit Code and Regulation Z, Truth in Lending Act,
in regards to making and servicing of the loans. This
exhibit was introduced by Terra, Inc., and its admission
was not for any limited purpose. It is good evidence of
the number and types of loans and of the regular business in which Terra, Inc., was engaged.
The fact that Terra, Inc., has regularly submitted
to examination by the State Department of Financial
Institutions (as U.C.C.C. administrator) also has evidential weight. It constitutes an admission of the applicability of the Act and of the business of Terra, Inc.
Moreover, Mr. Frandsen testified that it was his "practice" not to loan without real property security (R. 227),
and Mary J o Smith testified that "most of the notes we
make are form notes," and that she doesn't "usually"
mention security in the note (R. 196, 197).
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The trial court found (R. 12) that the regular business of Terra, Inc., included the making of consumer
loans, and that the loan to the Waseschas was a consumer loan.
This finding is not only supported by the evidence,
but demanded by it. Even if Mr. Frandsen's testimony
were believed, two or three loans a year to "friends and
people I know" (R. 161) are enough. The loan to the
Waseschas certainly was not an isolated transaction.

Ill
A P P E L L A N T ' S DISCLOSURES D I D NOT
COMPLY W I T H T H E REQUIREMENTS OF
T H E U T A H UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE OR T H E F E D E R A L T R U T H I N L E N D I N G ACT.
Both the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the
Federal Truth in Lending Act give debtors a right to
rescind transactions in which residences are taken as
security. The Utah statute, 70B-5-204 Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides:
Debtor's right to rescind certain transactions.
— (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of a consumer credit sale or consumer loan with respect to which a security interest is retained or acquired in an interest in land
which is used or expected to be used as the residence of the person to whom credit is extended,
the debtor shall have the right to rescind the
transaction until midnight of the third business
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day following the consummation of the transaction, or the delivery of the disclosure required
under this section and all other material disclosures required by this act, whichever is later, by
notifying the creditor, in accordance with the
rules of the administrator, of his intention to do
so. The Creditor shall clearly and conspicuously
disclose, in accordance with the rules of the administrator, to the debtor in a transaction subject
to this section the rights of the debtor under this
section. The creditor shall also provide, in accordance with the rules of the administrator, an
adequate opportunity to the obligor to exercise
his right to rescind any transaction subject to this
section. (Emphasis added.)
The Federal Truth in Lending Act is substantially
the same, except that it refers to "consumer credit transactions" and to regulations of the Federal Reserve
Board rather than those of the administrator. 15 U.S.C.
§1635.
The administrator and the Federal Reserve Board
have both adopted regulations governing notifications
of right of rescission.
"Regulations pursuant to the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code" were adopted by the administrator
effective January 18, 1971. Section 1.9(2) provides:
Notice of opportunity to rescind. Whenever
a customer has the right to rescind a transaction
under Paragraph (a) of this section, the creditor
shall give notice of that fact to the customer by
furnishing the customer with two copies of the
notice set out below, one of which may be used
by the customer to cancel the transaction. Such
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notice shall be printed in capital and lower case
letters of not less than 12 point bold face type on
one side of a separate statement which identifies
the transaction to which it relates. Such statement shall also set forth the entire paragraph (d)
of this section, "Effect of Rescission." / / such
paragraph appears on the reverse side of the
statement, the face of the statement shall state:
"see reverse side for important information about
your right of rescission/' Before furnishing
copies of the notice to the customer the creditor
shall complete both copies with the name of the
creditor, the address of the creditor's place of
business, the date of consummation of the transaction, and the date, not earlier than the third
business day following the date of the transaction, by which the customer may give notice of
cancelation. (Emphasis added.)
[The notice is in the form set forth in Exhibit 9.]
Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board,
adopted pursuant to authorization in the Federal Truth
in Lending Act, is substantially identical.
The notification produced at the trial by Terra,
Inc., was defective in at least two particulars. I t did not
set forth the "date, not earlier than the third business
day following the date of the transaction, by which the
customer may give notice of cancelation." The notice,
sent no earlier than June 30, 1971, provided:
If you decide to cancel this transaction, you
may do so by notifying Terra, Inc., at 353 East
Fourth South, S.L.C., Utah 84111, by mail or
telegram sent not later than midnight of October
11,1970. * * * [Emphasis added.] '
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Information as to the effect of the rescission was
printed on the reverse, but the front did not contain the
required "see reverse side * * *."
The court properly held that this notice did not
comply with the U.C.C.C. or the Truth in Lending Act,
and that the statement of transaction claimed to have
been sent with the notification of right of rescission was
inadequate.
Since all of the material disclosures required by the
statutes were not made to the Waseschas at any time
prior to the filing of suit by Mrs. Wasescha on June 15,
1973, the three day statute of limitations was never activated.
The statutory scheme is to require more than token
compliance. Creditors must make the disclosures and
give the notices in accordance with the rules of the administrator and the Federal Reserve Board. It is no
answer to say that the debtor was told he had some
rights and was obligated to find out whether the notice
meant what it said.
In Palmer v. Wilson, 359 F.Supp. 1099 (D.C. Cal.
1973) the court was faced with a similar problem. At
the time they applied for the loan on June 14, the borrowers were furnished with a notice of right to rescind
which stated that the debtors had to rescind by June 19,
although the loan was not consummated until June 20.
The court held that the statement of right to rescind
was inadequate, saying:
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In addition to the failure to disclose information concerning the terms of the loan, defendants
failed to properly inform plaintiffs of ther right
to rescind. As discussed, when plaintiffs applied
for a loan, they were provided with a notice of
their right to rescind in the form prescribed by 12
C.F.R. §226.9(b). The form, however, states
that the loan was consummated and the three day
rescission period began to run on June 14, and
that plaintiffs had to rescind by June 19. In fact,
as defendants themselves have argued in this
proceeding the loan was not consummated until
June 20. Thus this statement failed to properly
disclose the details of plaintiffs' right to rescind
contrary to 15 U.S.C. §1635(a); 12 C.F.R.
§226.9 (b).
IV
T H E EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS SHOW
T H E AMOUNT OF I N T E R E S T P A I D BY
MRS. W A S E S C H A .
Inasmuch as this is an action for rescission, the
court properly considered not only the amounts repaid,
but the amounts received by Mrs. Wasescha from the
loan proceeds. She testified that she received $2,000.00
(R. 175). Mr. Wasescha testified that she had received
$2,000.00 to $2,500.00 (R. 213).
Mrs. Wasescha made all of the payments shown in
the Terra, Inc., payment book (Exhibit 5), which
totaled $3,350.00. She made the final payment of
$4,032.00 from the proceeds from the sale of the home
(R.201).
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Mrs. Wasescha had been joint owner of the home
with her former husband (R. 164). Later she and Mr.
Wasescha purchased her former husband's interest (R.
182). Thereafter, Mr. Wasescha conveyed his interest
to Mrs. Wasescha and disclaimed any interest in the
property (R. 108). There is no doubt that the home was
hers, as were the sale proceeds. In his testimony Mr.
Wasescha stated that he had "sent payments of $500.00,
as I remember." Appellant has tortured this remark
into testimony that he had made two payments (perhaps
more) of $500.00 each, but the records of Terra, Inc.,
preclude such conclusion.
The payment book (Exhibit 5) was sent to Mrs.
Wasescha in January, 1972, The only payments made
by anyone other than Mrs. Wasescha were made prior
to that date. The Terra account card (Exhibit 4) shows
that five payments were made prior to January, 1972,
each in the amount of $100.00.
Mrs. Wasescha received not more than $2,500.00.
She paid to Terra, Inc., $7,382.73, or $4,882.73 more
than she received. It is technically arguable that the
court should have awarded her judgment against Terra,
Inc., for the larger sum, with a judgment over against
Mr. Wasescha for $2,000.00—but the effect on Terra,
Inc., wouldn't be changed.
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V
T E R R A , INC., W A S N O T E N T I T L E D TO
A N Y I N T E R E S T ON T H E A M O U N T S L O A N E D TO T H E W A S E S C H A S .
The District Court held that the Waseschas were
entitled to rescission of the loan transaction and that
Terra, Inc., was obligated to refund all amounts paid in
excess of the principal.
This holding is required by the applicable statutes.
It is provided in 70B-5-204 Utah Code Annotated 1953:
When a debtor exercises his right to rescind
under subsection (1), he is not liable for any
credit service charge, loan finance charge, or
other charge, and any security interest given by
the debtor becomes void upon the rescission.
An almost identical provision is found in 15 U.S.C.
§1635(b):
When an obligor exercises his right to rescind
under subsection (a) of this section, he is not
liable for any finance or other charge, and any
security interest given by the obligor becomes
void upon such a rescission.
Under 70B-3-109 Utah Code Annotated 1953:
(1) "Loan finance charge" means the sum of
(a) all charges payable directly or indirectly by the debtor and imposed directly or indirectly by the lender as an incident to the extension of credit, including any of the following types of charges which are applicable: interest or any amount payable under a point,
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discount, or other system of charges, however
denominated, premium or other charge for any
guarantee or insurance protecting the lender
against the debtor's default or other credit
loss; and
(b) [other charges not material to the issue
in this case.]
Although the term finance charge is not specifically defined in the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§1605 sets out the items which are included in the finance charge, among them interest, time price differential, service or carrying charge, loan fee, fee for investigation or credit report, finder's fee, etc. Regulation Z,
12 C.F.R. §226.2 (q) defines "finance charge" to mean
"the cost of credit determined in accordance with
§226.4." The later section includes interest as part of the
finance charge.
The six percent interest provided in 15-1-1 Utah
Code Annotated 1953 applies only where there is no
governing contract or statute. The section has no application to situations in which a transaction is rescinded
for violation of the Uniform Commercial Credit Code
or the Truth in Lending Act.
The intent of the two statutes is clear. A creditor is
not to receive any return on his money if he violates certain provisions of the statutes. Usury statutes historically have been so applied.
It has been held that 15 U.S.C, §§1635 and 1640
are not exclusive remedies, and that a debtor may obtain
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both rescission and a penalty of up to $1,000.00. See
Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9 Cir. 1974),
cited supra. No penalty was sought in this case.
VI
T H E T R I A L COURT CORRECTLY H E L D
THAT T H E RESPONDENTS W E R E ENT I T L E D TO R E S C I S S I O N .
The appellant, Terra, Inc., argues that Mr. Wasescha was not entitled to rescission because he did not
ask for it, and seems to argue that Mrs. Wasescha was
not entitled to rescind because Mr. Wasescha did not
join her in seeking that relief.
Although Mr. Wasescha did not specifically ask
for rescission in his counterclaim, he did set out a claim
supporting rescission. Paragraph 2 of the counterclaim
(R. 109) avers that Terra, Inc., failed to make the disclosures required by law, particularly those relating to
the security interest. And in his demand for judgment,
Mr. Wasescha asked for general relief.
Many courts today hold that the demand for judgment is not part of the complaint (or counterclaim), and
that the court should grant relief justified by the averments of the pleading and the evidence at the trial.
Other cases regard the demand for judgment as part of
the complaint, but hold that a demand for general relief permits the court to enter a judgment for any relief
supported by the pleadings and evidence.
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In her complaint, Mrs. Wasescha asked for rescission of the entire transaction, and for a determination of
the amounts of money owed by her and her husband, respectively. The court tried the issue, rescinded the transaction, and entered a judgment that Mrs. Wasescha
was entitled to return of all of the amounts that were
paid to Terra, Inc., in excess of the principal amount
lent.
Under the provisions of 70B-5-204 Utah Code Annotated 1953, a "debtor" is given a right to rescind the
transaction in which his residence is taken as security.
Under the provisions of 15 U.S.C. §1635 the "obligor"
is given the right to rescind the transaction. Under Regulation Z a "customer" is given the right of rescission.
12 C.F.R. §226.9. Under 12 C.F.R. §226.2 (o) "customer" means:
A natural person to whom consumer credit is
offered or to whom it is or will be extended, and
includes a co-maker, endorser, guarantor, or
surety for such natural person who is or may be
obligated to repay the extension of consumer
credit. (Emphasis added.)
The provisions of 12 C.F.R. §226.9 (f) relating to
joint ownership is meant to expand the class of permissible plaintiffs, and "joint owners" should be construed to include all who have an interest in the residence, including a possessory interest.
Whether Mrs. Wasescha could have maintained
this action without joining Mr. Wasescha is academic,
because she did join him. Under Rule 19, Utah Rules
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of Civil Procedure, a person who should join as a plaintiff may be made a defendant. In this case Mrs. Wasescha made her co-obligor a party defendant and
placed before the court all of the facts and circumstances
which would permit it to enter a judgment to which the
evidence entitled the parties, whether or not the pleadings were amended. Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

VII
A P P E L L A N T W A S N O T E N T I T L E D TO B E
A W A R D E D ATTORNEY'S F E E S FROM LAM A R S. W A S E S C H A .
The trouble with the claim of Terra, Inc., for attorney's fees, is that it did not prove any right to recover
on the note.
At the time the action was brought, Mrs. Wasescha
was making regular payments of principal and interest.
No default had been declared, and Mrs. Wasescha continued to make regular payments on the note until she
sold her home and paid off the principal balance.
It is apparent that the counterclaim on the note and
mortgage was filed in retaliation after Mrs. Wasescha
filed her complaint. The note required only that payments be made on principal and interest. Those payments were being made and the note was not due until
April 7, 1974.
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VIII
T H E T R I A L COURT P R O P E R L Y AWARDE D T H E A T T O R N E Y S F E E S TO MRS. W A SESCHA.
In support of the argument that Mrs. Wasescha
was entitled to no attorney's fees in this case, appellant
has cited two sections of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code. H e did not cite 70B-5-202(8) Utah Code Annotated 1953:
In any case in which it is found that a creditor
has violated this Act, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the debtor.
IX
R E S P O N D E N T S DID NOT W A I V E
R I G H T TO R E S C I N D .

THEIR

Appellant correctly observes that there are limitations upon the extent to which the debtors can be said to
have waived their rights under the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act,
a buyer, lessee, or debtor may not waive or agree
to forego rights or benefits under this act.
(2) A claim by a buyer, lessee, or debtor
against a creditor for an excess charge, other violation of this act, or civil penalty, or a claim
against a buyer, lessee, or debtor for default or
breach of a duty imposed by this act, is disputed
in good faith, may be settled by agreement.
(70B-1-107 Utah Code Annotated 1953).
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Although the District Court ruled that accord and
satisfaction, more properly compromise and settlement,
was not an issue in the case, the appellant brings it in by
citing the above section and using a claimed agreement
to try to show a waiver. But the testimony of Mr.
Frandsen, which begins at R. 234, is insufficient to
establish any agreement or waiver:
Mr. Roe called my office and indicated how
much was owing on the note. I says, "as of what
date?" I think he first indicated February 1, so
I had my secretary bring the interest up to that
date. * * * H e said that they were going—they
wanted a release of mortgage. I gave him a pay
off figure then I think I sent him a letter subsequently confirming or at least advising him what
the daily interest rate was according to the cut
off date. * * *
As to the amount demanded by Terra, Inc., I
never made any demand upon Mr. Roe or Mr.
Wasescha or Mrs. Wasescha. H e called up and
wanted to know what the payoff was and I told
him I would have my secretary compute it. * * *
I t was shortly, oh, about the 5th or 6th of January [Mr. Roe] called my office. The conversation was very brief. H e indicated what's the
amount owing on the note? I said, "as of what
date?" And I believe he gave me some cut off
figure, and he said that the Waseschas were going to pay the note, I said, "well, I have expended $17.00 and I believe 16 cents in costs." * * *
Well, then he mentioned, "what about attorney's fees?" And I said, "well"—I hesitated and
I thought this was one matter that I would like
to have behind me and I said just pay me the
principal amount and interest and costs.
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There was never any discussion, suggestion, or intimation to the effect that Mrs. Wasescha was interested in dismissing her lawsuit. The trial court heard the
evidence and found:
In January, 1974, it became necessary for the
plaintiff to sell her property at 577 North Hills
Drive because of the transfer of her husband's
employment from Salt Lake City, Utah to
Seattle, Washington, and in order to effect the
sale plaintiff was required to obtain a release of
the mortgage taken by defendant Terra, Inc.
(R. 12 and 13).
In making the payments to defendant Terra,
Inc., including the payment of January 10,1974,
plaintiff did not intend to and did not waive her
right to rescind the loan transaction of October
8, 1970.
There was no bargaining with respect to settlement, and there was no consideration for any agreement
on the part of Mrs. Wasescha. Terra, Inc., gave up
nothing. The entire counterclaim for foreclosure was
spurious, inasmuch as the mortgage indebtedness had
never been declared in default and Mrs. Wasescha had
continued to make payments before and after this action
was filed.

X
T H E P R O V I S I O N S O F 70B-5-204 U T A H CODE
A N N O T A T E D 1953 A R E N O T U N C O N S T I T U TIONALLY VAGUE.
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Claiming that no citation of authority is necessary,
the appellant cites none in support of the proposition
that the Utah Consumer Credit Code is unconstitutionally vague in defining consumer loan with reference to
persons "regularly engaged in the business of making
loans."
It is a difficult argument to answer without either
(1) merely saying that the statute is not vague and uncertain, or (2) citing the hundreds of cases in which
terms with varying degrees of meaning have been held
to be sufficiently certain under the due process clauses
of the United States and State constitutions.
Some general rules relating to vagueness and uncertainly, however, may be helpful. As stated in 82
C.J.S., Statutes, §68, p. 113:
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are used therein,
or because of the employment of a term, without
defining it, where such term is one commonly
used or understood, or where such term is one
that has acquired a well defined meaning, is sufficiently known or understandable to enable
compliance with the statute, or has acquired an
established meaning through established precedents, technical knowledge, or the sense and experience of men.
This court has stated that a statute will not be held void
for uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical, effect
may be given to it, that neither absolute exactitude of
expression nor complete precision of meaning are ex-
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pected in a statute, and cannot be required. State v.
Packard, 122 Utah 2d 369, 250 P.2d 561. (1952).
In Unified School District No. 255, 204 Kan. 282,
463 P.2d 499, (1969) the Supreme Court of Kansas
said:
A statute will not be declared void for vagueness and uncertainty where it employes words
commonly used, previously judicially defined, or
having a settled meaning in law. (50 Am Jur.,
Statutes, §473, pp. 486, 490)
It is submitted that the term "regularly engaged in
the business of making loans," is easily defined, each of
the words having a customary meaning. The word "regularly" has been used many times in various state and
federal enactments.
While situations might develop in which particular
parties would have doubts as to whether they were "regularly engaged in the business of making loans." Such a
situation is not present here. Terra, Inc., was licensed
originally as a small loan company, and subsequently
as a supervised loan company, and making loans is its
business. It is not in a shadowy area.

CONCLUSION
Terra, Inc., is a licensed supervised loan company.
It has engaged in business as a lender since 1964. At the
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time of the examination by the Department of Financial
Institutions on June 30, 1971, it had 11 outstanding
loans totaling more than $28,000.00.
Terra, Inc., is regularly engaged in the business of
making loans, and it regularly makes loans. I t is subject
to the regulatory provisions of the Truth in Lending
Act and the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
In making the loan to the Waseschas in this case it
did not comply with the requirements of either act. It
failed to furnish adequate disclosure statements or a
satisfactory notification of right to rescind.
Under the provisions of the statutes and the regulations, the Waseschas had a right to rescind the transaction, which they did by court process, and Terra, Inc.,
was not entitled to any finance or other charge. To allow
the company interest at the statutory rate would be to
eliminate express wording from the statutes.
After a full hearing the trial court found the facts
in favor of the Waseschas, and against Terra, Inc. I t
dismissed the counterclaim of Terra, Inc., "no cause of
action." Thus there would be no right to attorney's fees
on that counterclaim.
I t is submitted that despite the myriad claims of
error on the part of Terra, Inc., it was given a fair trial.
All of the evidence was considered, and the court properly applied the governing statutes and the legal principles.
The judgment of the District Court should be af36
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firmed and remanded to the District Court for the purpose of fixing an attorney's fee to be awarded respondents for this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
Thelma B. Wasescha
Herschel J. Saperstein
Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
LaMar S. Wasescha
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